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Abstract 
____________________________________________________________ 
In his Treatise of Human Nature Hume argues for a provocative account of the 
soul; the soul - or self, as he prefers to call it - is nothing but a bundle of 
perceptions. But this bold thesis, concedes Hume, gives rise to a predicament 
concerning two incompatible propositions, or principles as he calls them: one 
on the nature of perceptions, the other on the capabilities of the mind: "In 
short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in 
my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions 
are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion 
among distinct existences". But the situation is not hopeless, thinks Hume. 
Someone might be able to show that these principles are actually consistent: 
"Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover 
some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions". (Treatise 636, my 
emphasis) My paper is an attempt to throw light on this important 
component in Hume’s analysis of his account of the self. In the course of our 
investigation of Hume's suggestion that an hypothesis can resolve his 
contradiction we will learn more about his conception of a contradiction - 
ultimately enriching our understanding of his account of the soul. 
____________________________________________________________ 
Keywords: soul, self, contradiction, labyrinth, perception, bundle theory, 
ontology 
 Towards the end of his Treatise of Human Nature David Hume expresses 
serious reservations about the standing of his innovative account of the soul. As he 
sees it, the bold account of the soul - or self, as he prefers to call it, that he so 
confidently outlines in his 1739 magnum opus is seriously defective, driving him into a 
labyrinth.  
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 In the appendix to the Treatise Hume suggests that the predicament that he is 
in where his account of the self is concerned can be traced to two incompatible 
propositions, or principles as he calls them: one on the nature of perceptions, the 
other on the capabilities of the mind. 
 In short, there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in 
my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct 
existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct 
existences.(Treatise 636, Hume’s emphasis) 
But the situation is not hopeless, thinks Hume. Someone might be able to 
show that these principles are actually consistent, and accordingly, dissolve the 
labyrinth: "Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover 
some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions". (Treatise 636, my emphasis) 
This suggestion is intriguing. The assumption that an additional proposition is able to 
“reconcile those contradictions”, thereby dissolving his labyrinth, calls for closer 
attention. In my analysis I shall throw light on this important component of Hume’s 
assessment of his account of the self. In the course of the investigation of Hume's 
suggestion that an hypothesis can resolve his contradiction we will learn more about 
his conception of a contradiction - ultimately enriching our understanding of his 
account of the soul. 
It is important to notice from the outset that the two propositions that Hume has 
singled out for consideration are different. This poses a serious problem for Hume’s 
assertion that two of the major principles in his account of the self involve a 
contradiction that hopefully someone will be able to solve. Let ‘A’ represent the first 
principle and ‘B’ the second. With this representation it does not follow that the 
conjunction of the two principles entails a contradiction. To put it more pointedly, we 
can show formally that the adoption of these different propositions, on their own, 
cannot entail a contradiction: 
 1. A 
 2. B        /∆ ~ (A . B) 
 
 This reasoning is invalid as it stands. The suggestion that two propositions 
contradict each other amounts to the proposal that they are mutually exclusive: if the 
one proposition is true, the other must be false.  
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 The assertion of the one proposition strictly entails the denial of the other. 
They certainly cannot have similar truth-values. Of course, this is to assume that the 
law of excluded middle is correct, and nothing in Hume’s analysis suggests that this 
fundamental requirement must be set aside or even rejected. When Hume claims that 
two of his major theses in his account of the self are contradictory, it therefore seems 
reasonable to assume, I suggest, that he is not using ‘contradiction’ in the strict 
traditional sense outlined here. 
 
 So perhaps Hume in the appendix to the Treatise is using ‘contradiction’ in a 
non-traditional sense. That this is a plausible interpretation of his understanding of a 
contradiction is strengthened when we take into account his later suggestion about a 
third proposition serving as a means to reconcile the apparent contradiction. As I 
understand the traditional conception of a contradiction, propositions in a 
contradictory state of affairs cannot be reconciled i.e. they are logically incompatible. 
What then does Hume mean when he uses the word ‘reconcile’? Unfortunately for us, 
he does not explain this important term in the appendix. Nor does he elaborate on 
this term in his discussion of personal identity in the main section of the Treatise. So 
we are on our own. But we are not completely at sea, for Hume does provide us with 
some interesting material in the appendix that we can use to construct a workable 
Humean understanding of the term.  
Section One: Hume on ‘Reconcile’ 
 When Hume declares that he is in a quandary, unable to ‘render consistent’ 
the two principles that he views as contradictions, he singles out a state of affairs that 
in his opinion could rescue the day: 
 Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did 
the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou’d be no difficulty in 
the case. (Treatise 636) 
 If only humans were more capable or the world of perceptions different, we 
could resolve the conflict that bedevils the Treatise account of the self. More 
specifically if perceptions were supported by a substance – presumably an indivisible 
self, or soul – or if the mind could discern the connections alleged to exist between 
our perceptions, the problem alluded to by Hume in the appendix would disappear.  
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 That is to say, there would be no inconsistency between the two principles 
that form the basis of his account of the self. Reality, unfortunately, being what it is, 
the inconsistency persists:  
 But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human 
understanding. We only feel a connexion or a determination of the thought, to pass 
from one object to another. (Treatise 635, Hume’s emphasis) 
However, precisely how would a change to the reality that Hume outlines, or even the 
adoption of a different reality or ontology, resolve the contradiction that allegedly 
compromises the two principles central to his account of the self? For that matter, 
can Hume’s idealized world solve his problem?  
At first blush it seems that alterations to reality, or perhaps the adoption of a different 
ontology, cannot solve Hume’s problem. Was his not a problem about the 
incompatibility or inconsistency of propositions or principles? But propositions, in an 
important sense, are not in the world – they are apart from it, and possibly about the 
world and its constituents. Propositions occupy a realm different to that occupied by 
the constituents of the world. So precisely how can a change in the world resolve the 
logical or linguistic problem that Hume is referring to in the appendix? Hume does 
not tell us in any direct manner, unfortunately. But there are interesting hints in the 
Treatise that might prove useful. 
I think that an answer lies buried in the appendix. Immediately after outlining an 
idealized world that he suggests can resolve the problem of the inconsistent 
principles, Hume informs us of a second way out of the labyrinth that has entrapped 
him. As he sees it, the discovery of a suitable hypothesis also enables us to settle the 
matter: 
 Others, perhaps or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover some 
hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions. (Treatise 636, my emphasis) 
If we can show that two propositions that appear to be irreconcilable are actually not 
as dissonant as we thought, we will be in the position to remove the contradiction. 
The reconciliation will need to reduce, and possibly completely eliminate the 
discrepancy between the two propositions.  Hume offers a method to do just this. 
Early in the appendix he presents a semantic principle that enables philosophers and 
the vulgar to converse with each other even though their respective world views differ 
dramatically.  
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 This semantic principle holds the key to my question above on the relevance 
of changes to one’s ontology to problems that are logical or linguistic. We need to 
consider this principle in a little detail.  
Section Two: On Hume’s Semantic Principle  
 In his writings Hume makes much of the disparity between philosophers and 
the uneducated vulgar. The appendix reflections from the Treatise on problems with 
his account of the self provides him with yet another opportunity to explore this 
issue. As Hume sees it, philosophers and the vulgar can be regarded as individuals 
locked in an intractable conflict about their respective accounts of reality. The vulgar 
confidently assert that there are physical objects, such as chimneys and chairs, for 
instance, while the philosophers are more circumspect and insist on the existence of 
discrete perceptions. These radically different conceptions of reality suggest that this 
is an irreconcilable conflict, and that there is a contradiction between their worlds. 
The discrepancy between these two world views seems to be so significant that the 
affirmation of the one perspective appears to entail the negation of the other. But in 
the appendix Hume suggests that a bridge can be erected between these rival 
perspectives. As he sees it, while each of the competing worlds is legitimate in its own 
right, or without internal conflict – for there is no contradiction within that world - 
these fundamentally different worlds can and need to be reconciled, or brought into 
alignment, if the adherents of these different perspectives are to understand each 
other. Giving priority to the philosopher, Hume suggests that a semantic principle 
must be found that shows how to reconcile propositions about physical objects with 
propositions on perceptions: 
 ...no proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which 
is not so with regard to perceptions. (Treatise 634) 
 Each of these worlds can be successfully understood and described by their 
respective proponents. Accompanying these consistent – i.e. logically harmonious - 
worlds there are consistent sets of symbols to refer to these worlds and their contents. 
The world of the philosopher, with its emphasis on perceptions, for instance, does 
not involve contradictions: 
 All perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable, 
and may be conceiv’d as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any 
contradiction or absurdity. (Treatise 634) 
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But the world of the vulgar is equally free of tension or ontological conflict: 
 But this table, which is present to me, and that chimney, may and do exist 
separately. This is the doctrine of the vulgar, and implies no contradiction. (Treatise 
634) 
 However, the discourse of the vulgar, with its references to physical objects, 
will remain meaningless unless these expressions can be shown to be co-extensive 
with those of the philosophers. Only those claims about non-perceptions that can be 
rewritten as claims about perceptions can be understood.  
 For Hume, the philosopher’s world of perceptions is the touchstone of 
intelligibility. Hence any proposition that is not about a perception must be translatable 
into one about perceptions if that proposition is to be regarded as intelligible. It is the 
educated philosopher after determined that the competing discourses entail 
competing ontological commitments, who will be able to reconcile the different 
worlds. But it is important to recognize that the reconciliation will be conducted on 
the philosophers’ terms. This is not a democratic process with some give or take from 
both sides of the issues. No. It is an unequal process – an asymmetrical procedure- 
with priority given to the philosophers’ conception of reality. In this way the apparent 
discrepancies between the world of the philosopher and that of the vulgar can be 
minimized. With their semantic principles outlining the relationship between 
perceptions and physical objects the philosophers will be able to relate the two 
worlds.  
 In short, the philosopher will be able to reconcile the fundamentally different 
worlds of perceptions and physical objects. The conflict, or contradiction, to use 
Hume’s terminology, can therefore be reconciled. 
 All of which suggests that Hume’s proposal to reconcile the two major 
principles of his account of the self amounts to the proposal to formulate a semantic 
principle that enables investigators to relate the world of the vulgar to that of the 
philosopher. This semantic principle will function as a speculative proposition, or 
hypothesis, to explicitly connect worlds that might appear to be essentially unrelated 
to each other. What initially appears to be an irredeemable conflict, or contradiction, 
turns out to be an illusion that can be eliminated with appropriate ingenuity and 
equipment. The tool that is needed is an appropriate semantic principle, or hypothesis 
to bridge the world of physical objects with that of perceptions. All that remains is for 
the philosopher to formulate it and to put it to use.  
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This helps explain Hume’s optimism at the end of the appendix. After outlining the 
fundamental problem with his account of the self – a problem that on the surface 
appears to be so serious that he refers to it as a contradiction – he ends on a 
somewhat positive note. Not wanting to conclude his discussion with the suggestion 
that the fundamental problem will never be solved, as we have seen, Hume says this: 
 I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, 
perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that 
will reconcile those contradictions. (Treatise 636) 
 In his eyes, the situation is not hopeless. His provocative account of the self, 
for all its problems, can be saved. A compromise can be found to reconcile what 
appear to be two irreconcilable propositions. 
 This suggests an interesting view on language. Principles or propositions, for 
Hume, are not dissimilar to human beings in that they possess a range of properties 
and manifest various relationships with each other that can be studied, altered or 
possibly even manipulated. For instance, individual human beings display various 
levels of integrity. They possess various moral characteristics; some people are good, 
some are bad, some happy, some depressed, and so on.   
By the same token propositions also possess attributes that can be identified 
and studied; some propositions are true, some false, some obscure, some clear, some 
intelligible, some unintelligible, and so on. And as with human beings, propositions 
are often related to each other. On occasion the relationship is amicable, on occasion 
it is tempestuous. When two propositions conflict with each other the tension 
between them might reach such a level as to warrant the use of the term 
‘contradiction’. This appears to be Hume’s assessment of the relationship between the 
two principles central to his account of the self. So, while one might be tempted to 
conclude that nothing can be done to smooth over the discrepancies between the two 
foundational principles that his account of the self rests on, we need not take this 
course of action. As I have shown in my analysis above, we can preempt this defeatist 
attitude. For the tension or contradiction can be eliminated – provided that a working 
hypothesis, or semantic principle is found that connects the two rival principles that 
underscore Hume's account of the self. 
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 However, might there be more to the problem of reconciliation than meets 
Hume's eyes? Surely the attempt to reconcile the philosopher and the vulgar, with 
their respective ontologies, is unlikely to be problem free. Consider what happens 
when one attempts to reconcile competing world views. When we seek to reconcile 
two individuals -  perhaps two brothers who are angry with each other - we strive to 
establish peace between them - assisting them to bury the hatchet. Where there was a 
conflict in the past over a specific issue, we hopefully now have some agreement: an 
attempt has been made to alter the relationship between the two in order to establish 
harmony where previously there was unrest. While the act of reconciliation has helped 
to reduce the distance between the two brothers, it very likely has not removed the 
fundamental differences between the brothers.  Sharp differences are bound to persist 
in the world views that brought about the conflict in the first place. But the world of 
the vulgar with his ontological commitments to physical objects is fundamentally 
different to that of the philosopher with her commitment to perceptions. Can these 
radically different worlds, their their respective languages, perspectives and values be 
reconciled? This intriguing issue on the commensurability of different world views 
with their respective linguistic frameworks cannot be dealt with here. 
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